# SRA Modeled-vs-Real Manifest

This inventory describes the public SRA artifact as it exists in the browser. The artifact is an **interactive reference model**. It demonstrates mechanism and decision shape; it does not host, enforce, or protect real resources. All fixtures are synthetic, and no real protected information may be entered.

| Demonstrated for real | Modeled and labeled | Not attempted, and why |
|---|---|---|
| **Warrant signing and gate verification.** The page generates an ephemeral Web Crypto keypair, canonicalizes the immutable outward warrant payload, signs it, and verifies the signature against the known public key during gate step 4. The displayed prefix is `ed25519:` or `ecdsa-p256:` according to the algorithm actually used. | **Key custody.** UI label: “Keys are generated in-page and ephemeral, demonstrating the signature/verification mechanism. Production requires key custody in an HSM/KMS under community control.” | **HSM/KMS custody, key rotation, and compromise runbooks.** A public static page cannot provide community-controlled hardware custody, durable issuer operations, or incident response. |
| **JSON canonicalization.** A faithful RFC 8785/JCS subset sorts object keys, preserves array order, rejects non-JSON values and invalid Unicode scalar sequences, and uses ECMAScript number serialization before signing and verification. | **Governance legitimacy.** UI label: “A signature proves who signed bytes; it does not prove that the governance process was legitimate or that the claims are true.” | **Authentication of governing authorities.** The browser has no authoritative identity provider or community governance trust root. Signing a fixture cannot establish standing. |
| **CSPRNG identifiers.** Warrant, determination, gate-decision, contest, capability, public-statement, restricted-note, translation, issuer, profile, evidence, and resource identifiers use `crypto.getRandomValues`; no public and hidden sequence is shared. | **Principal authentication.** Gate label: “Assume authenticated principal synthetic-principal. No identity provider is contacted, and authentication is not standing.” | **OIDC, institutional identity federation, and standing adjudication.** Authentication can identify a principal; it cannot independently confer warrant-issuing authority. |
| **DVA issuance without a computed verdict.** The condition worksheet displays considerations without numbers or weights. Each proposed operation remains `PENDING_GOVERNANCE` until governance enters its determination; no aggregate verdict is recorded. The browser validates proposal scope, profile scope, issuance attestation, signature, and exact operation coverage; it never chooses a viability outcome. | **Synthetic governance entry.** UI label: “A governance determination has been entered under the synthetic profile's issuance rule.” | **A real DVA convening process.** The browser cannot determine who has standing, whose witnessing is required, how dissent is carried, or what must remain unnamed under community law. |
| **Distinct object stores.** `DvaDetermination`, `GateDecision`, `ContestedDesignation`, `PublicRefusalStatement`, and `RestrictedGovernanceNote` occupy separate in-memory structures. A gate denial and a non-viability determination write no refusal statement. | **Store separation.** UI label: “This separate browser-memory structure demonstrates separation only. It is not access control or secure storage.” | **Separated production databases, service accounts, keys, and backups.** In-memory maps demonstrate type and write-path separation, not operational isolation or authorization. |
| **NDE non-recording at the shared registry boundary.** There is no NDE tier, counter, object, registry entry, count, or placeholder in the public and restricted stores. The two external-query fixtures return identical status, body, headers, and byte length. | **NDE response shape only.** UI label: “In a real deployment, equivalence across timing, caching, rate-limiting, logs, and backups must be measured under adversarial testing; it cannot be inferred from code. This model demonstrates the response shape only.” | **Statistical NDE timing-equivalence testing.** Meaningful evidence requires a production-like service, caches, load balancers, logs, backups, rate limits, traffic generation, and adversarial measurement. |
| **Constraint-preserving receiver compatibility.** Typed rules cover permissions, prohibitions, affirmative obligations, temporal conditions, audience boundaries, derivative rules, and retention/deletion. Exact preservation returns `COMPATIBLE`; a real signed, versioned policy translation can return `AUTHORIZED_TRANSLATION`; unilateral weakening or tightening returns `INCOMPATIBLE`; unknown terms return `INDETERMINATE`. `INDETERMINATE` never releases. | **Receiver declaration.** The receiver profile is a synthetic declaration of accepted policy and supported obligations. A passing browser check does not show that an institution will obey after receiving plaintext. | **Receiver federation and attestation.** The static model cannot establish institutional trust, inspect remote configuration, compel legal compliance, or prevent screenshots, copying, exfiltration, and bad-faith reuse. |
| **Operation-scoped contest behavior.** A signed `ContestedDesignation` contains opaque identifiers, scope, interim rule, process reference, activation and review times, and state sequence. Other gate checks still run. Irreversible disputed disclosure fails closed; an uncontested storage operation may continue. Passing `review_after` requires re-attestation and never becomes consent. Resolution requires a different, newly signed warrant. | **Recognized process.** The fixture uses the synthetic governance profile as the recognized process boundary. An unverified outsider assertion is ignored and cannot freeze a resource. | **Governance adjudication.** The model protects the interval but cannot decide which witnessing is faithful, resolve disagreement, or make a captured process legitimate. |
| **Fail-closed gate order.** The gate performs the twelve ordered checks: principal stub; opaque handle; latest warrant; real signature and trusted issuer; warrant state; operation-scoped contest; exact scope; receiver compatibility; community consult stub; obligations; capability; synthetic reveal. Unknown policy, malformed dates, stale revocation, unsupported obligations, and indeterminate compatibility deny. | **Community-decision-service consult.** Gate label: “Modeled community-decision-service consult: ALLOW. No real community decision service is contacted.” | **A real community decision service.** Protected context, availability, authenticated requests, revocation, and community-controlled operations require a service outside the static page. |
| **Affirmative-obligation checks.** Known obligation types are validated against receiver support. A due obligation must carry opaque evidence; a past-due obligation without evidence denies. | **Evidence meaning.** Opaque fixture references demonstrate the field and due-date rule, not the truth, sufficiency, or community acceptance of evidence. | **Audit and evidence verification.** The browser has no trusted evidence store, reviewer process, or durable audit trail. |
| **Capability lifecycle and scope.** The model mints a real signed, short-lived capability only after the preceding checks pass. Consumption verifies signature, expiry, exact resource/action/audience/workflow/purpose, and an in-memory single-use set. Reuse has no second side effect. Only then is a synthetic payload revealed. | **Transport boundary.** UI label: “Sender-constraining (mTLS/DPoP) and atomic key release require a real service; this model demonstrates the token lifecycle and scope-checking.” | **mTLS/DPoP, replay-resistant distributed consumption, and atomic key release.** These require a sender, receiver, network protocol, durable atomic state, and protected key material. |
| **Deliberate refusal authorship.** Public and restricted records require an explicit type, governance-authored text, profile scope, attestation, real signature, CSPRNG identifier, and idempotency key. No prose is generated from gate diagnostics, and an absent or invalid disclosure posture creates no record. | **Restricted visibility.** The model labels the restricted store as an in-memory structural demonstration, not an externally enforced audience boundary. | **Secure restricted discovery and authorization.** A public browser cannot provide partner authentication, authorization, compartmented queries, or durable retention controls. |
| **Strict browser-side schemas and safer rendering.** Unknown fields and enums fail closed in the decision model. User-entered text is rendered with DOM text nodes, not HTML parsing. The SRA routes use an external-script/external-style Content Security Policy without `unsafe-inline`. | **Browser accessibility checks.** Native controls, associated labels and fieldsets, keyboard tabs, visible focus, text status labels, `aria-live`, reduced-motion handling, and narrow-width reflow model an accessible interaction surface. | **Production security and full assistive-technology certification.** A static review cannot substitute for independent penetration testing, multiple browser/AT combinations, organizational accessibility testing, or ongoing regression monitoring. |
| **No sensitive form persistence.** Proposal and authorship drafts remain in memory, are never written to URLs or `localStorage`, and are reset on page exit. | **Status-banner preference.** A session-only collapsed/expanded preference contains no form or protected state. | **Storage of real protected data.** Explicitly prohibited. This model is not a repository, record system, or secure processing environment. |

## Narrative Summary

What the model now establishes is narrower and more useful than a claim of production readiness. It establishes that SRA's distinctions can be represented coherently: governance enters DVA outcomes rather than receiving them from arithmetic; warrants transmit bounded determinations without carrying protected standing; receiver compatibility prohibits unauthorized weakening and tightening; contests govern an operation without validating unrelated checks; NDE acts before shared recording; gate denial does not publish; and capability release occurs only after exact, ordered checks.

What remains outside the artifact is not a deployment backlog disguised as a feature list. It is the infrastructure and governance boundary the browser cannot honestly cross: real authority authentication, community-controlled key custody, protected decision services, isolated stores and backups, sender-constrained transport, receiver federation, deletion enforcement, adversarial NDE testing, and any handling of real protected information.